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Abstract
We revisit the welfare consequences of international financial integration (IFI) in a two-country
OLG model where countries differ in the capital share of national income. We establish four main
results: (i) the country with the highest capital share is the net recipient of capital flows as its output
per effective units of labour is lower in autarky (i.e. developing economy), consistently with empirical
evidence; (ii) on aggregate, IFI brings a 10% increase in consumption for the developing economy; (iii)
IFI has uneven effects across generations: the first generation in the developing (developed) economy
incurs a welfare loss (gain), while the remaining generations gain (lose) from IFI; (iv) labour (capital)
should be taxed in the developing (developed) country to ensure that IFI is Pareto superior to financial
autarky.
Keywords: international financial integration, capital flows, capital shares, OLG models, neoclassical growth
models
JEL classification: F21, F36, F41, F65, O47
1 Introduction
The issue of whether it is beneficial for a country to open its financial markets to the rest
of the world is a central question for policy makers, especially in developing countries.
International financial integration (IFI) is often seen as a way for developing countries
to speed up their transition to the steady state of the economy given their condition of
capital scarcity. However, in a neoclassical growth model, Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006)
∗Durham University Business School, Durham University.
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show that the gains from international financial integration are quantitatively small for a
typical non-OECD country.
In this paper, we argue that the reason why the gains are found to be small in this
class of models is that developing countries are assumed to be identical to developed ones
except for their initial level of capital1. However, consider two countries which differ in
some key parameters of the economy: if they remained financially isolated, the return
on capital would not be the same in the long-run. Therefore, if the countries integrated
their capital markets, capital would flow from one country to another not just during the
transition, but also at the steady state of the economy. In this context, the conclusion
that the welfare gains from opening domestic financial markets are elusive do no longer
hold true2.
Our first contribution is to study the pattern of capital flows and assess their welfare
consequences in two-country neoclassical growth model where countries are heterogeneous
in the importance that capital has as a factor of production in the aggregate production
function (capital share). This dimension of heterogeneity has been ignored by the liter-
ature on the basis of the idea, backed empirically by Gollin (2002), that differences in
capital shares across countries are negligible. However, Feenstra, Inklaar and Timmer
(2015) have recently shown that not only capital shares are not constant over time but
cross-country differences are much wider than we previously thought3. As a consequence,
they argued that the “one-size-fits-all labor share of 70 percent that is commonly assumed
in the literature is a simplification that is not supported by the facts”. For instance, Table
1 shows that the average capital share in 2005 was much higher than 0.30 and there is a
lot of cross-country variation. Moreover, non-OECD countries tend to have a much higher
capital share than OECD-countries.
Given this evidence, in our model the two countries will differ along two main dimen-
sions: the capital share and the initial level of capital, where only the second channel is
usually considered in the literature4. The two-country aspect of the model will also allow
1Hoxha, Kalemli-Ozcan and Vollrath (2013) show that the gains can be larger by assuming that capital goods are
imperfect substitutes.
2In fact, the literature on global imbalances has emphasized that capital flows are explained by several dimensions
of heterogeneity such as differences in financial markets development (Caballero, Gourinchas and Fahri, 2008; Mendoza,
Quadrini and Rı´os Rull, 2009; Coeurdacier, Guibaud and Jin, 2015), pension systems (Eugeni, 2015), demographics (Backus,
Henriksen and Cooley, 2014).
3Their findings are based on new data which are now part of the Penn World Tables 8.1 database.
4As this is the first attempt to analyze the problem, we assume that capital shares are constant over time and abstract
from the fact that capital shares have been rising in many countries. In our framework, time-varying capital shares would
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Table 1: Capital shares in 2005.
Mean Standard deviation Min Max Observations
All countries 0.48 0.13 0.15 0.78 109
OECD countries 0.42 0.08 0.25 0.62 33
non-OECD countries 0.51 0.14 0.15 0.78 76
Notes. The data are from the Penn World Tables 8.1.
us to investigate the spillover effect on a typical developed economy when a “not so small”
emerging country such as China financially integrates.
Our second contribution is that we relax the assumption of intergenerational altruism
by exploring the consequences of IFI in a two-country model with overlapping generations
in the spirit of Diamond (1965). The reason behind this choice is two-fold. Firstly, it is
well known that the steady state interest rate in the Ramsey model is only pinned down
by the representative agent’s discount factor. Any other dimension of heterogeneity (such
as capital shares) cannot give rise to capital flows among countries at the steady state of
the economy, since the autarkic interest rates would be identical. For this reason, OLG
models are quickly becoming a favourite tool for studying issues such as current account
imbalances, which are often a permanent phenomenon5. Secondly, important reforms are
typically undertaken from governments, which tend to respond to the people who currently
alive, independently from whether they are elected or not. Even if a reform leading to
the openness of capital markets has considerable benefits in the future, it might not be
implemented by the government if it is known to have detrimental effects for the present
generations. Hence, we believe that departing from the representative agent framework
might be informative as to why e.g. many developing countries still use capital controls.
Firstly, we prove that the country with the highest capital share has a lower output
per effective units of labor and a higher interest rate in autarky. As a consequence, once
financial markets are integrated, the high-capital share country borrows from the rest of
the world in the transition to the integrated steady state and in the long-run. While inter-
national financial integration reduces output differences between the two countries, there
is never full convergence: a country with a high capital share is relatively poorer than a
country with a low capital share, independently from the level of financial integration. We
imply that the steady state of the autarkic as well as the integrated economy shifts over time.
5See footnote 2.
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then provide empirical evidence to support the finding that there is an inverse relationship
between the capital share and output per effective units of labor. While Table 1 suggests
that we should find such relationship, Caselli and Feyrer (2007) and Feenstra, Inklaar and
Timmer (2015) had previously found no correlation between output per capita and capital
shares. We find the same result in our sample, but this conclusion is overturned once we
adjust output per capita by productivity, as suggested by the model. We also show that
countries with high capital shares tend to have a negative FDI position, consistently with
the model which predicts that they should be net recipients of capital flows.
Secondly, we show that the process of international financial integration has substan-
tial welfare consequences. To start with, we focus on the intergenerational effects of IFI
for the country with the highest capital share (the poor country). To compare with the
literature, we calibrate the model as closely to Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006) as possible
except for the capital share in the developing country: in our sample, the average capi-
tal share of non-OECD countries weighted by their share of world GDP is 0.49. In this
context, we find that the welfare gains for the generations born at the integrated steady
state of the economy amount to up a 82.8% welfare increase in equivalent consumption.
In the transition to the steady state, the welfare gains are even higher and decline as the
steady state approaches. However, not all generations gain from IFI. The first generation
experiences a fall in their income in the second period of life (due to a drop in the inter-
est rate), hence suffering a welfare loss of 18.5% in equivalent consumption. Therefore,
our model suggests that if political power is in the hands of the young, then financial
integration does not take place. Nonetheless, this would come at the expense of the sub-
sequent generations who would be able to reap huge gains. This result can help to explain
why, although the level of financial integration has increased over time, it is still low in
developing countries6.
The above numbers are obtained considering that a developing country’s typical contri-
bution to the dynamics of the world interest rate is small. In fact, we calibrate the size of
the developing country using the average share of world GDP of non-OECD countries. As
this case is alike to a small open economy, the welfare impact on the developed country is
negligible. The novelty of our framework with respect to Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006) is
that our two-country structure allows us to study the impact on developed countries of the
financial integration of a large emerging country such as China. In the developed coun-
6See e.g. Chinn and Ito (2006).
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try, we find that the initial generation would gain from the higher interest rate enjoyed
on domestically-owned and foreign-owned capital. However, the subsequent generations
can lose up to 5% in equivalent consumption. As the developed country reaches a lower
steady state under financial openness, IFI implies a lower wage for each generation (hence,
a lower lifetime income).
The uneven intergenerational effects of IFI do not imply that the reform is not beneficial
from an aggregate perspective and for each country involved. In fact, we show that a social
planner which takes into account the welfare of all generations has a higher utility under
financial openness than under financial autarky in all the scenarios considered. A typical
small developing economy gains 10% in equivalent consumption, while a large emerging
economy such as China experiences a welfare gain of 4%. As we hinted above, the large
welfare gains for the developing/emerging economy are due to the fact that the country
can reach a higher steady state through capital flows, as countries are heterogeneous
beyond their initial levels of capital. While the spillover effects on the developed country
are negligible in the first case, the aggregate welfare gains for a developed economy if
China opens its financial markets are not much larger as equal to 0.35%.
Although both countries would gain from financial openness, our results point out
that IFI is not Pareto superior to autarky as there are winners and losers. However, as
aggregate income within each country is higher under financial integration, there exist
redistribution policies which make all generations better off. As we stressed above, since
the loser from IFI in the developing country is the first generation, financial openness
might never take place in the absence of intergenerational altruism. However, the first
generation could be persuaded to agree to financial openness under the condition that the
government commits to a redistribution policy. We show that this can be achieved through
the following balanced budget policy: the government should tax the labour income of
the second generation and redistribute it to the first generation when it becomes old
to compensate it for the fall in the real interest rate arising from the process of IFI.
A labour income tax of 20% is enough to ensure that IFI is Pareto superior to financial
autarky. In the case of China’s financial openness, redistribution policies in the developed
country become relevant too because of the significant negative spillover effects on each
generation (except the first). A successful redistribution policy would consists in taxing
capital income and redistribute it to the workers in every period. Since the welfare losses
from IFI increase over time, the capital income tax should be time-varying and reach the
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value of 14% at the steady state of the economy.
Finally, this paper is related to the complementary strand of literature which sees
international financial integration as a way to improve the degree of risk sharing across
countries7. The scale of the benefits that international financial integration can bring
to countries through risk sharing heavily depend on the model structure and calibration.
Recently, Coeurdacier, Rey and Winant (2015) have proposed a model which feature both
the risk sharing and the capital scarcity channels and have concluded that the welfare
gains are no larger than a permanent increase in consumption of 0.5%. In common with
this paper, Mendoza, Quadrini and Rı´os-Rull (2007) and Antunes and Cavalcanti (2013)
also explore the welfare consequences of IFI while departing from the representative agent
framework. In their case, heterogeneity stems from differences in the initial levels of wealth
and earning abilities, not by the absence of altruism across generations.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the model and derives analytical
results on the pattern of capital flows. Section 3 provides empirical evidence in support
of our results. Section 4 investigates the intergenerational consequences of international
financial integration, for a small developing economy and a large emerging economy. In
section 5, we design fiscal redistribution policies within countries which make sure that
all generations gain from IFI. All the proofs are in the Appendix.
2 A two-country model with heterogeneous capital shares
Our set-up is embedded in a standard two-country Diamond model (1965).
The distinctive feature of our model is that the two countries have access to different
constant returns to scale technologies for the production of the consumption good. In
particular, we assume the following:
Assumption 1 (Production functions) Firms in country i produce according to the
Cobb-Douglas production function Yi,t = Ki,t
αi(Zi,tLi,t)
1−αi, where α1 < α2.
As a period lasts for around 30 years in a two-period OLG model, we assume that
capital fully depreciates after one period: δ = 1. Let us define kˆi ≡ KiZiLi as country i’s
capital stock per effective units of labor and ki ≡ KiLi as the capital stock per capita, so
that the production function of country i per effective units of labor is: yˆi,t = kˆ
α
i,t.
7See e.g. Cole and Obstfeld (1991), van Wincoop (1994), Obstfeld (1994), Tesar (1995), Mendoza, Quadrini and Rı´os-Rull
(2007), Antunes and Cavalcanti (2013).
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To keep the model tractable, we assume that the utility function is logarithmic:
Ui,t ≡ log cyi,t + β log coi,t+1 (1)
Finally, population and technology grow at the same constant rate in the two countries:
Li,t = (1 + n)Li,t−1 and Zi,t = (1 + g)Zi,t−1.
2.1 Autarky
Firstly, we consider the two economies in autarky as this will be useful to analyze the
integrated economy. For the moment being, both capital and labour are immobile. The
firms’ problem is to choose kˆauti,t that maximises the profit function:
max
kˆauti,t
kˆaut
αi
i,t −Rauti,t kˆauti,t − wˆauti,t (2)
where wˆauti,t =
wauti,t
Zi,t
which implies that factor prices are:
Rauti,t = αikˆ
autαi−1
i,t (3)
wˆauti,t = (1− αi)kˆaut
αi
i,t (4)
The maximisation problem of consumers is also standard. Agents maximise (1) subject
to:
cyi,t
aut + sauti,t = w
aut
i,t (5)
coi,t+1
aut = sauti,t (1 + r
aut
i,t+1) (6)
which implies that the saving function is:
sauti,t =
β
1 + β
wauti,t (7)
The capital market clears in every country:
Kauti,t+1 = Li,ts
aut
i,t
In equilibrium, Rauti,t = 1 + r
aut
i,t . Substituting the saving function and the price of labour
from the first-order condition of the firms, we obtain:
Kauti,t+1 = Li,t
β
1 + β
Zi,t(1− αi)kˆautαii,t (8)
which implies that the dynamics of the capital stock per effective units is characterized
by the following equation:
(1 + n)(1 + g)kˆauti,t+1 =
β
1 + β
(1− αi)kˆautαii,t (9)
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It is well known that a unique and stable steady state exists under these assumptions on
preferences and technology. The steady state capital stocks and interest rates in autarky
are:
kˆauti =
[
β(1− αi)
(1 + β)(1 + n)(1 + g)
] 1
1−αi
(10)
Rauti =
αi(1 + β)(1 + n)(1 + g)
β(1− αi) (11)
We can now prove the first result:
Proposition 1 (Autarkic steady states) As α1 < α2, then kˆ
aut
1 > kˆ
aut
2 and R
aut
1 <
Raut2 .
Corollary 1 kˆaut1 > kˆ
aut
2 implies that yˆ
aut
1 > yˆ
aut
2 .
In this section, we have shown that the country with the highest capital share has a
lower output per effective units of labor and a higher interest rate in autarky. Therefore,
we will refer to country 1 (2) as the rich (poor) country.
2.2 International financial integration
As we are interested in the effects of financial markets’ liberalization, we keep the assump-
tion that firms can only hire domestic workers. Open economy variables are now marked
by the superscript ∗.
Since there is a common capital market and there are no frictions, all firms take the
same interest rate as given. The demands for inputs in the two countries now satisfy:
R∗t = α1kˆ
∗α1−1
1,t = α2kˆ
∗α2−1
2,t (12)
wˆ∗i,t = (1− αi)kˆ∗αii,t (13)
Although interest rates are equalized, capital stocks per effective units of labor are not
equalized as the capital shares are not identical.
We can now write the equilibrium equation and analyze capital accumulation in the re-
spective countries in the integrated economy. The (world) capital market is in equilibrium
as long as (world) savings are equal to the sum of the domestic capital stocks:
∑
i
K∗i,t+1 =
∑
i
Li,ts
∗
i,t =
β
1 + β
∑
i
Li,tZi,t(1− αi)kˆ∗αii,t t > 0 (14)
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Dividing both sides of the equation by LtZt:
(1 + n)(1 + g)(ρ1kˆ
∗
1,t+1 + ρ2kˆ
∗
2,t+1) =
β
1 + β
[
ρ1(1− α1)kˆ∗α11,t + ρ2(1− α2)kˆ∗α22,t
]
(15)
where ρi is country i’s share of the world’s effective units of labor (country size): ρi ≡
Li,tZi,t
LtZt
.
2.2.1 Steady state
At a steady state of the world economy, the capital stocks of the two countries do not
change over time: kˆ∗i,t = kˆ
∗
i for every i.
(1 + n)(1 + g)(ρ1kˆ
∗
1 + ρ2kˆ
∗
2) =
β
1 + β
[
ρ1(1− α1)kˆ∗α11 + ρ2(1− α2)kˆ∗α22
]
(16)
To prove the existence of a steady state, we rewrite the difference equation using the
first-order conditions of the firms and show the existence of a steady state interest rate.
Proposition 2 (Existence, uniqueness and stability of the steady state) For any
given R0, the (world) interest rate converges to a unique and stable steady state R
∗.
We can define the net foreign assets per effective units of labor of country i as follows:
Definition 1 (Net foreign assets)
aˆi,t+1 ≡ sˆi,t
(1 + n)(1 + g)
− kˆi,t+1 (17)
Let us now study the pattern of capital flows at the steady state.
Proposition 3 (Net foreign assets (steady state)) Country 1 (2) is the lender (borrower)
country at the world interest rate R∗, which lies between the two autarkic interest rates:
Raut1 < R
∗ < Raut2 .
Corollary 2 Since Raut1 < R
∗ < Raut2 , then kˆ
∗
2 > kˆ
aut
2 and kˆ
∗
1 < kˆ
aut
1 . This implies that
yˆ∗2 > yˆ
aut
2 (yˆ
∗
1 < yˆ
aut
1 ).
As the world interest rate is lower than the autarkic interest rate, financial openness
allows the poor country to reach a higher output as compared to the autarkic steady
state. The opposite occurs for the developed country.
Nonetheless, the next Proposition shows that the poor country can never catch up with
the level of output of the rich country.
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Proposition 4 (Lack of cross-country convergence) If (1+β)(1+n)(1+g)
β(1−α1) >
(
α2
α1
)α2(1−α1)
α2−α1 ,
then yˆ∗1,t > yˆ
∗
2,t for all R
∗
t ≥ R∗.
Although the rental rate of capital is equalized across countries, the level of capital
that satisfies the first-order condition of the firms will vary according to the technology
(equation (12)). Hence, we can never expect cross-country convergence as a result of
international financial integration when the dimension of heterogeneity comes from the
technological side of the economy.
Proposition 4 gives a sufficient condition under which the rich (poor) country stays
rich (poor) under international financial integration. This condition is not very stringent.
To make it even less binding, let us assume that n = g = 0. Let us also set the capital
share of country 1 to 0.3, which is the value normally chosen for developed countries.
Considering that a period corresponds to 30 years, a quarterly discount factor of 0.99
means that β = 0.299. We then verify numerically that the inequality holds for any value
of α2 between 0 and 1.
2.2.2 Dynamics
Before studying the dynamics, we establish the direction of capital flows when the financial
markets of the two countries integrate. Suppose that the two countries open their financial
markets at t = 1. To start with, we need to introduce the two countries’ initial conditions.
Assumption 2 (Initial conditions) At t = 1, kˆ1,1 = kˆ
aut
1 and kˆ2,1 < kˆ
aut
2 .
We study the dynamics of capital flows in the realistic scenario where the rich country
is at its autarkic steady state, while the poor country is along its transition path to the
autarkic steady state.
To analyze the direction of capital flows at the openness, we must characterize the
interest rate which clears the world capital market at t = 2. Since the marginal production
of capital in the poor country (country 2) is higher than the marginal product of capital
in the rich country (country 1), we can show the following result:
Proposition 5 (Net foreign assets (financial integration)) Under Assumption 2, the
poor country borrows from the rich country at t = 1.
Proposition 6 (Capital stock (dynamics)) For each country i, the function kˆi,t+1 =
ψ(kˆi,t) is increasing and concave.
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Figure 1: The dynamics of capital in closed and open economy: an example. ρ1 = ρ2, α1 = 0.3, α2 = 0.4,
kˆ2,1 = 0.005 and kˆ1,1 = kˆ
aut
1 .
 
Our initial conditions imply that that the initial world interest rate is higher than its
long-run value: R2 > R
∗. By Proposition 2, the world interest rate falls until it reaches
the steady state. Since the countries’ capital stocks are a negative function of the world
interest rate, they accumulate over time and converge to the steady state capital stocks
kˆ∗1 and kˆ
∗
2. Figure 1 shows an example of how the dynamics of capital in the two countries
changes from autarky to financial integration.
Our next step is to analyze the pattern of capital flows along the transition to the
steady state. The strategy for the proof is similar to Proposition 5. In each period, we
can take the interest rate R∗t as given and ask which country has a higher marginal product
of capital, i.e. we consider the interest rates which would prevail if the countries were in
autarky in period t+ 1. As the marginal product of capital of country 2 is always higher
than the marginal product of capital of country 1, we can state the following result.
Proposition 7 (Net foreign assets (dynamics)) Under Assumption 2, the poor coun-
try borrows from the rich country for any t > 1.
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Figure 2: The relationship between output per effective labor units and capital shares
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Notes. The data source is the Penn World Tables 8.1. The number of countries is 109 and the data are from 2005. The
regression coefficient is significant at 5% level.
3 Empirical evidence on capital shares
In this section, we provide some empirical evidence to support the idea that differences
in capital shares can help to explain the lack of cross-country convergence as well as the
direction of capital flows.
To start with, our model suggests that the country with the highest capital share is
the country with the lowest GDP per effective units of labor. This statement holds true
independently from countries’ level of financial integration (Propositions 1 and 4).
Figure 2 shows that there is a robust negative relationship between output per effective
units of labor and the capital share. This result does not contradict previous empirical
findings of Caselli and Feyrer (2007) and Feenstra, Inklaar and Timmer (2015), which
found no statistical relationship between output per capita and capital shares: we find
the same result in our sample (Figure 3). However, our paper stresses the importance of
adjusting output per capita with total factor productivity8.
Propositions 5 and 7 also show that the country with the highest capital share should
8Interestingly, Ortega and Rodriguez (2006) find a negative relationship between capital shares and output per capita
using UNIDO and OECD’s industrial surveys data.
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Figure 3: The relationship between output per capita and capital shares
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Notes. The data source is the Penn World Tables 8.1. The number of countries is 109 and the data are from 2005. The
regression coefficient is not significant.
borrow from the rest of the world. Since countries differ in their production technologies,
it seems appropriate to concentrate on foreign direct investments (FDI) as a measure of
private capital flows to test the relevance of our channel.
Figure 4 illustrates that there is a negative (statistically significant) relationship be-
tween net FDI positions and capital shares: this means that a country with a higher
capital share is more likely to be a recipient of capital flows.
Therefore, the data support the idea that differences in capital shares can help to
explain countries’ different level of development (as proxied by output per effective units
of labor) as well as the direction of FDI flows. In the next section, we analyze the welfare
implications of international financial integration in a world where countries differ in
capital shares.
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Figure 4: The relationship between net FDI positions and capital shares
ARGARM
AUSAUT
BAHBEL
BEN
BOL
BOT
BRA
BUL
BUR
CAM
CAN
CAR
CHL
CHN
COL
COSCR
CYPCZE
DEN
DOMEGY
EST
FIJ
FIN
FRA
GER
GRE GUA
HON
HK
HUN
ICE
INS
IRE
I R
ITA
IVO
JAM
JAP
JOR
KAZ
KEN KYR
LAT
LES
LIT
LUX
MAC
MLS
MAL
MAU
MRT
MEX
MOL
MON
MOR
MOZ
NAM
NET
NEW
NOR
PAN
PAR PER
PHI
POL
POR
ROM
RUS
RWA SEN
SER
SIE
SIN
SLK
SLV
SAF
SKOSPA
SRI
SWA
SWE
SWI
TAI
TAJ
TAN THA
TOG
TRI
TUN
TUR
UKR
UK
USA
URU
-1
00
-5
0
0
50
10
0
N
et
 F
D
I %
 G
D
P
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
capital share
Data Fitted values
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Milesi-Ferretti database (2007). The number of countries is 99 and the data are from 2005. The regression coefficient is
significant at 5% level. OPEC countries are excluded from the sample.
14
4 The intergenerational consequences of international financial
integration
4.1 The main trade-off
The calculation of the welfare implications of moving from a scenario of financial autarky
to financial integration necessarily depend on the demographic structure imposed to the
economy. In models where agents are infinitely-lived, it simply involves comparing the
welfare of the representative agent in each country under the two different scenarios. In
overlapping-generations models, it is relevant to consider the welfare consequences for
each generation born after the reform.
Let us define the gains from international financial integration for an agent born at t
as the difference in utility obtained under financial integration and autarky:
∆Ui,t ≡ U∗i,t − Uauti,t
Recall that we assume full depreciation, hence 1 + r∗ = R∗. Given the saving function
and factor prices, the indirect utility of such agent under the two regimes can be written
as:
U∗i,t = log
(
1
1 + β
(1− αi)kˆαi∗i,t
)
+ β log
(
β
1 + β
(1− αi)kˆαi∗i,t αikˆαi−1∗i,t+1
)
Uauti,t = log
(
1
1 + β
(1− αi)kˆαiauti,t
)
+ β log
(
β
1 + β
(1− αi)kˆαiauti,t αikˆαi−1
aut
i,t+1
)
Using the above expressions and simplifying, the gains from international financial inte-
gration can be written as:
∆Ui,t = (1 + β)αi(log kˆ
∗
i,t − log kˆauti,t )︸ ︷︷ ︸
wage channel
− β(1− αi)(log kˆ∗i,t+1 − log kˆauti,t+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
interest rate channel
(18)
Let us consider the poor country. We have proved that the country achieves a higher
steady state under financial integration. Since the difference equations describing the
behavior of kˆ are both increasing and concave, it is easy to show that log k∗2,t > log k
aut
2,t
also holds during the transition to the steady state, for any initial condition9.
Equation (18) illustrates that agents born in the poor country face a fundamental
trade-off. On the one hand, financial integration means a higher wage which increases
consumption both in the first and in the second period of life. On the other hand, a higher
9For an example, see Figure 1.
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capital stock also implies a drop in the interest rate which decreases the consumption of
the old.
At the steady state of the economy, equation (18) simplifies to:
∆Ui = [(1 + β)αi − β(1− αi)](log kˆ∗i − log kˆauti ) (19)
which implies that:
∆U2 > (<)0 if
α2
1− α2 > (<)
β
1 + β
(20)
On the other hand, the conditions for the rich country are the opposite since log k∗1,t <
log kaut1,t .
In an overlapping-generations model where countries differ in their rate of time pref-
erence, Buiter (1981) showed that the ambiguous long-run welfare effects are related to
whether the steady state capital stock of an economy in autarky is below or beyond the
golden rule10. In fact, assume that the planner of each country chooses the capital stock
which maximizes the utility of the generations born at the steady state:
max
kˆi,c
y
i ,c
o
i
log cyi + β log c
o
i (21)
subject to:
(1 + g)(1 + n)kˆi + c
y
i +
coi
(1 + g)(1 + n)
= kˆαi (22)
It is easy to show from the first-order condition for ki that the golden rule level of capital
for country i is:
kˆGRi =
(
αi
(1 + n)(1 + g)
) 1
1−αi
(23)
Comparing equation (23) with (10), it follows that:
kˆGRi > (<)kˆ
aut
i if
αi
1− αi > (<)
β
1 + β
(24)
Conditions (20) and (24) combined show that the country with the highest capital share
(poor country), which has a lower capital stock in autarky, gains from financial integration
in the long-run only as long as the autarkic steady state is dynamically efficient. On the
other hand, the country with the lowest capital share gains from financial integration in
the opposite case: as the lender country faces a lower capital stock (and therefore output)
in open economy, it can only gain if the country is accumulating too much capital in
autarky (dynamic inefficiency)11.
10More recently, Darreau and Pigalle (2014) derived condition (20) with Cobb-Douglas utility and production functions.
11In Buiter (1981) and Darreau and Pigalle (2014), the less patient country plays the role of the country with the highest
capital share.
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Figure 5: The set of capital shares under which an economy is dynamically (in)efficient for β = 0.269.
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Ultimately, whether a country gains from opening their financial markets in the long-
run is an empirical/calibration question. We tackle this issue in the next section. For the
moment being, it is enough to notice that for a quarterly discount factor of 0.99, which
corresponds to a discount factor of 0.269 considering that a period lasts for 30 years, the
set of capital shares under which an economy is dynamically efficient is quite large. Figure
5 shows that as long as both countries have a capital share larger than 0.1749, then the
poor (rich) country gains (loses) from IFI in the long-run. The novelty of this paper is
that we also consider the whole transition path to the steady state when assessing the
gains from IFI.
4.2 Calibration and methodology
To make our results comparable with the literature, we borrow the parameter values of
Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006) where possible. We also follow Gourinchas and Jeanne
(2006) in selecting 1995 as the benchmark year. The only precaution that we need to take
in calibrating most parameters is that a period roughly lasts for 30 years in a two-period
OLG model.
In Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006), the annual growth rates are 1.2% and 0.74% respec-
tively for productivity and population. The equivalent growth rates have been calculated
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using the following formula:
(1 + xyearly)
30 = 1 + x 30 · xyearly ≈ x
Given the Cobb-Douglas production function, we compute the yearly interest rate of
the United States as follows:
R1,yearly =
α1
kˆ1,1995
yˆ1,1995
=
0.3
2.68
= 0.11
where the capital-output ratio is taken from Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006), who also set
country 1’s capital share at 0.3. As we did for the growth rates, we convert the yearly
interest rate using the formula: 30 · 0.11 ≈ 3.36. The discount factor is then derived
as a residual by plugging the known parameter values into the solution for the autarkic
interest rate (11). We find that β = 0.269, which approximately corresponds to a yearly
discount rate of 0.96 as in Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006).
Country 2’s capital share is calculated as a weighted average of non-OECD countries’
capital shares in 1995, where the weights are constructed taking countries’ share of world
GDP (IMF, World Economic Outlook). Country 2’s share of the world’s per effective
units of labor (country size) is calculated as the average share of world GDP of non-OECD
countries.
Finally, we derive the two countries’ initial capital stock per effective units of labour.
Since kˆ
yˆ
= kˆ1−α, then kˆ can be derived once we know the capital-labour ratio and the
capital share. For country 2, we adjust the yearly capital-output ratio from Gourinchas
and Jeanne (2006) to our OLG framework (dividing it by 30) and use the average capital
share in the developing country calculated above: kˆ =
(
1.40
30
) 1
1−0.49 . Regarding country 1,
Table 2: Parameter Values
Country 1’s capital share α1 = 0.3
Country 2’s capital share α2 = 0.49
Discount factor β = 0.269
Productivity growth rate g = 0.36
Population growth rate n = 0.222
Country 2’s size ρ2 = 0.0042
Initial capital stock per effective labor units (country 1) kˆ1,1 = 0.0317
Initial capital stock per effective labor units (country 2) kˆ2,1 = 0.0025
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we assume that it is at the autarkic steady state at t = 1. Hence, we calculate the initial
capital stock using equation (10).
We proceed as follows. Firstly, we calculate the interest rate path in open economy
using (62), which is a non-linear first-order difference equation. Using the first-order
conditions of the firms, the path of the capital stocks in the two countries are pinned
down. Finally, we compute the consumption allocations in the two countries. Given the
same initial conditions, we calculate the path for the autarkic capital stocks using (9) and
then the consumption paths of the two countries in autarky.
Next, we measure the gains from international financial integration as the percentage
increase in wealth that each generation under autarky would require to reach the level of
utility achievable under financial integration (Hicksian equivalent variation).
In particular, let us define the level of utility of the generation born at t respectively
under autarky and financial integration as follows:
Uauti,t = log c
y
i,t
aut + β log coi,t+1
aut (25)
U∗i,t = log c
y
i,t
∗ + β log coi,t+1
∗ (26)
Therefore:
log cyi,t
∗ + β log coi,t+1
∗ = log cyi,t
aut(1 + µi,t) + β log c
o
i,t+1
aut(1 + µi,t)
where µi,t is the percentage increase in wealth (which directly translates into an increase
in consumption) that would equate the utility of the generation born in country i at t
under autarky to the open economy level. After a few steps, we can show that:
µi,t = exp
U∗i,t−Uauti,t
1+β −1 (27)
4.3 The financial integration of a small developing economy
Figure 6 shows the intergenerational effects of international financial integration for a
typical developing country.
The first observation is that the generation born at t = 1 in the poor country would
lose if the domestic capital markets opened. As the initial capital stock is given, their
income when young as determined by the wage rate would not be affected. Therefore,
the wage channel in (18) drops out. But as the world interest rate at t = 2 would be
lower than the autarkic interest rate (Proposition 5), then the consumption when old
would drop and total utility fall. If the young influence the political decisions in the poor
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countries, our model could explain why financial integration is still limited in many poor
countries: the initial generation could suffer a welfare loss as big as 18.5% in equivalent
consumption12. As the initial generation in the poor country is worse off, this also means
that financial autarky is Pareto optimal.
However, such decision would come at the expense of future generations, which they
would all gain from international financial integration. The heterogeneity in capital shares
imply that those gains are permanent. As the poor country has a higher capital share,
it would reach a lower steady state as compared to the rich country if it remained in
autarky. In open economy, the developing country has the possibility to reach a higher
steady state (although remaining relatively poorer) as it receives capital flows from the
developed country. The wider is the difference in the capital shares, the wider is the gap
with the rich country and therefore the bigger are the gains from financial integration.
For our benchmark value of α2 = 0.49, the gains from international financial integration
are in the order of 82.8% of equivalent consumption in the long-run. If we set α2 = 0.35,
which reduces the difference in the capital shares across countries to a seemingly negligible
0.05, the long-run welfare gains are still substantial as they correspond to an increase of
7.7% of equivalent consumption. These might seem huge gains but they make sense once
we consider the case where the capital shares are identical, which is the economy analyzed
by Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006). In our OLG framework, the welfare gains approach
zero for the generations born at the steady state. Yet, the generations that live in the
transition period could reap substantial gains even when countries are identical. After the
initial loss, the generation born in year 2 would gain 21.4% of equivalent consumption. In
Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006), the representative household in the poor country overall
experiences an increase of 1.74% in permanent consumption but the change in output
growth can be as high as 27.65% at a one year horizon. We also need to keep in mind
that we are calculating the welfare consequences of shifting from a regime of full autarky
to a regime of full financial integration, which does not usually happen in one period.
Yet, this does not take away the fact that financial integration can involve substantial
long-run gains for a developing country.
It is also intuitive that the transitional gains from international financial integration
12See Chinn and Ito (2006). Antunes and Cavalcanti (2013) provide a similar argument in a context where agents are
heterogeneous in their wealth. In their setting, the median household is in favour of opening capital markets but if power
is in the hands of the rich households, then their incentive is to keep domestic capital markets closed.
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Figure 6: The intergenerational effects of IFI for a small developing economy for different values of the
capital share.
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Figure 7: The intergenerational effects of IFI for a small developing economy for different initial values
of capital.
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Figure 8: The spillover effects on the developed country when a small developing economy financially
integrates.
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are larger the lower is the initial capital stock of the poor country, as the transition to
the steady state is faster. Figure 7 shows the welfare gains for the top and bottom deciles
of the capital-output ratio of non-OECD countries as well as for the benchmark value (in
bold)13.
Finally, we report the welfare impact on country 1 in Figure 8. When the developing
country opens its financial markets, the initial generation gains as the rate of interest on
their savings (which are given) increases. However, all the other generations experience a
welfare loss. As country 1 converges to a lower steady state, the lifetime income of each
generation falls and hence does their utility. It is worth noting that the spillover effects
on the developed country is negligible from a quantitative point of view, as the average
size of a developing country is very small.
4.4 The financial integration of a large emerging economy
As a typical developing economy is very small, the welfare of the developed country
is barely affected as the world interest rate is very close to its autarkic interest rate.
Therefore, the quantitative results obtained above can be compared with other small
13As we did for the benchmark value, we divide the capital-output ratios of Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006) by 30 years
and calculate kˆ2,1 using our weighted measure of capital share for the poor country.
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open economy environments, which can be seen as a limit case of a two-country model.
However, a large emerging economy, through a larger ρ2 in equation (62), would have
a bigger influence on the dynamics of the world interest rate. In this section, we will
then ask the following questions: are the gains from international financial integration for
large emerging economies smaller? Moreover, are the spillovers effects on the rich country
significant?
Let us now consider a scenario in which China, the largest country in 1995 in our
sample, fully opens its domestic capital market. Let us set China’s capital share to 0.46,
which is the average between the measure of the Penn World Tables 8.1 and the number
calculated in Bai et al. (2006) in 1995. One of the main stylized facts that characterize
the Chinese economy over the past three decades is the steady increase in China’s share
of world GDP (Figure 9). To capture this fact, we allow for ρ2 to be time-varying. For
t = 1 and t = 2, we calibrate ρ2 taking China’s share of world GDP respectively in 1995
and in 2015. For the following periods, we consider two alternative scenarios. In the
first one, China’s share of world GDP is assumed to be equal to the 2015 value from
period three onwards. The second scenario is more optimistic on the Chinese economy
as it assumes that China’s share of world GDP will grow at the same rate for the next
thirty years, which implies that China’s country size would roughly be equal to half of the
world’s effective labor units by 2045. Possibly, the most realistic scenario is a situation
in between.
First of all, it can be observed that the long-run gains for China will be smaller if the
country gets larger, as the world interest rate would be closer to China’s autarkic interest
rate (Figure 10). The initial generation loses around 14% of equivalent consumption in
both scenarios while the subsequent generations would gain at least 34% in the long-run
(scenario 2).
On the other hand, Figure 11 confirms the intuition that the spillover effects on the
rich country increase with China’s size. As the world interest rate is higher than the
autarkic interest rate, the first generation always gains as the domestic capital stock falls
and the country experiences capital outflows (equation (18)). As long as China grows,
the generations born in the following periods still gain as the world interest rate becomes
closer to China’s autarkic interest rate. As soon as China stops growing, the rich country
loses out. If China’s weight in the world economy stays the same as in 2015, the long-run
losses will amount to -1.5% of equivalent consumption for the generations born in the rich
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Figure 9: China’s share of world GDP, 1995-2015.
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Notes. China’s GDP based on PPP share of the world total (in percentages). Source: World Economic Outlook Database
(IMF).
country. If China keeps growing at the same rate for the next thirty years, the losses will
amount to -4.7%.
The losses are much smaller than the gains achieved by the emerging country, thereby
suggesting that international financial integration is beneficial from the perspective of
aggregate welfare. However, our results suggest that there can be important distributional
effects, both within and across countries. In fact, although the rich country invests in the
poor country receiving rental income from abroad, the higher interest rate is not enough
to compensate the fall in the lifetime income that affects all generations.
Table 3: Parameter Values.
Country 2’s capital share α2 = 0.46
Country 2’s share of world’s effective labor units ρ2,1 = 0.05898
ρ2,2 = 0.17082
Initial capital stock per effective labor units (country 2) kˆ2,0 = 0.0055
4.5 Is international financial integration beneficial after all?
We have established that the process of international financial integration has impor-
tant distributional consequences across generations. On impact, the first generation loses
(gains) in the developing (developed) country, while in the transition to the steady state
24
Figure 10: The intergenerational effects of IFI for China.
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Figure 11: The spillover effects on the developed country of China’s financial integration.
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and in the long-run international financial integration is only beneficial for the generations
born in the developing country. While the spillover effects of financially integrating with
a small open economy are negligible, agents born in the developed country (except the
first generation) sustain non-negligible losses when a large emerging economy opens its
financial markets.
These results might put into doubt the notion that international financial integration
is a beneficial process for all countries involved. But is this really the case? To answer
this question, we ask whether a benevolent planner that cares about the welfare of all
generations would indeed pursue the path of financial openness for its country.
Deciding whether opening financial markets to the rest of the world or not is a discrete
decision, therefore a planner would simply need to evaluate the utility that all the gener-
ations within its country would face in the two alternative scenarios. The social welfare
function of country i at the time of financial integration (t = 1) in the two cases can be
defined as follows:
V auti,1 =
∞∑
t=1
γt−1Li,tUauti,t (28)
V ∗i,1 =
∞∑
t=1
γt−1Li,tU∗i,t (29)
We have already computed Uauti,t and U
∗
i,t in the previous section. The only parameter
that needs to be chosen is the discount factor of the planner. We assume that the discount
factor that the planner applies from one generation to another is the same discount factor
that each agent applies from one period to another. Hence, γ = β.
Next, we calculate the welfare gains of the social planner in terms of Hicksian equiv-
alent variation, where µi,P is the percentage increase in consumption in autarky which
would ensure that the utility of the planner is the same as under international financial
integration:
µi,P = exp
(
(V ∗i,1−V auti,1 )(1−β(1+n))
1+β
)
−1
We report the results in Table 4.
Our first observation is that both countries gain from international financial integration
from a social planner’s point of view. Moreover, the welfare gains for country 2 are not
negligible. In Gourinchas et al. (2006), the aggregate welfare gains for a small developing
economy are only 1.74% of equivalent consumption. The reason is that capital flows
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Table 4: The aggregate welfare consequences of international financial integration (µi,P )
Small economy Large economy
country 1 0.01% 0.35%
country 2 10.16% 4.78%
Notes. For the small economy case, we consider the benchmark set in Table 2. For the large economy case, we consider
Scenario 2 (Fig. 10-11) as the developed country loses the most in the long-run. We calculate Vi,t for T = 15, as β
15 is
already extremely small (2.79× 10−9).
are only temporary (they take place only for a period) and simply allow the small open
economy to reach its steady state faster. When capital shares are different across countries,
capital flows are permanent and allows the developing economy to reach a higher steady
state than in autarky. As IFI allows a better allocation of capital in every period, the
welfare gains are much higher. As one would expect, a small developing economy gains
more than a large emerging economy like China from the process of IFI: as the dynamics
of the world interest rate is mainly driven by the developed country, a small economy is
able to reach a much higher steady state as compared to a large economy, despite never
fully converging to the developed country’s output per capita.
It might seem surprising that the developed country gains, since all its generations
except the first one lose from international financial integration. However, the gains
enjoyed by the first generation are high enough to compensate all future losses, since the
first generation has the highest weight in the planner’s welfare function. Not surprisingly,
the developed country gains more when a large growing country such as China opens
its financial markets. However, the welfare gains from the perspective of the developed
country are still negligible.
This analysis shows the importance of studying the dynamic welfare effects of interna-
tional financial integration. If we only limited ourselves to a comparative statics exercise
between steady states, then the implication would be that the developed country should
not open its financial markets14. However, we have shown that this is clearly not the case
when taking into account the transitional effects.
14As we discussed in section 4.1, this depends on the fact that the developed country is dynamically efficient in our
calibration. See Buiter (1981) and Darreau and Pigalle (2014).
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5 Can international financial integration be beneficial for every-
one?
Although our results confirm the basic intuition that international financial integration
is beneficial for all countries involved from an aggregate perspective, we have shown
that not all generations would be affected in a positive way from the reform. But since
both countries are better off overall, could the two governments design redistribution
policies within their country to ensure that everyone reaps the gains from international
financial integration? Notice that a redistribution policy is particularly important for a
developing or an emerging economy. In fact, if political power is in the hands of the
young at the time of financial integration (the first generation) then the country would
not open its financial markets. However, this decision would come at the expense of
future generations, which would instead reap sizable welfare gains. Hence, a policy that
takes into account the detrimental effect of international financial integration on the first
generation is particularly desirable.
Firstly, we consider the small economy case. Since the spillover effects on the developed
country are negligible from a quantitative point of view, we assume that the government
of the developed country remains inactive. This is particularly convenient, so that we
understand the course of action that the developing country’s government should take
in isolation. When we look at the large country case, we will also consider possible
redistribution policies in the developed country so that international financial integration
is Pareto improving for all generations.
5.1 Fiscal redistribution in the developing economy
From the perspective of the developing country, a redistribution policy should involve
compensating the only loser from the process of international financial integration i.e.
the first generation. As financial markets integrate, the developing country experiences
capital inflows since its initial interest rate is relatively high. As the equilibrium interest
rate is lower when the economy opens, then the first generation experiences a drop in
consumption when old as the return on savings is lower than it would be in autarky. On
the other hand, the second generation receives a boost in wage income as capital inflows
imply faster capital accumulation.
To ensure that even the first generation gains from international financial integration,
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the government could commit at t = 1 to tax the labor income of the generation born in
the following period and redistribute it to the current generation in the old age following
a balanced budget rule. This policy only needs to be implemented at t = 2, since all
subsequent generations gain.
Let us define Tw,2 as the lump-sum transfer per capita that the first generation would
receive when old and τw,2 as the tax on labor income. The budget of the government is
then:
L2,1Tw,2 = L2,2τw,2w2,2 (30)
Since w2,2 = Z2,2(1 − α2)kˆα2∗2,2 and using the law of motion for the population, the above
expression can be rewritten as follows:
Tw,2 = (1 + n)τw,2Z2,2(1− α2)kˆα2∗2,2 (31)
We now explore how this policy would change the maximisation problem of the two
generations affected by the policy and hence the process of capital accumulation.
First generation - Let us consider the budget constraints that the first generation would
face if it expected a transfer from the government in the following period:
cy∗2,1 = w2,1 − s∗2,1 (32)
co∗2,2 = s
∗
2,1(1 + r
∗
2) + T
∗
w,2 (33)
The wage is not starred as it is given at the moment of financial integration. Maximising
the utility function (1) subject to the constraints above, we obtain the following saving
function:
s∗2,1 =
β
1 + β
w2,1 −
T ∗w,2
(1 + β)(1 + r∗2)
(34)
Since the agent expects a transfer from the government in the next period, it has an
incentive to save less. Plugging equation (31) and the first-order conditions of the firms
into the saving function, we can rewrite it as follows:
s∗2,1 =
β
1 + β
Z2,1(1− α2)
[
kˆaut2,1
α2 − (1 + n)(1 + g)τw,2kˆ
∗α2
2,2
βα2kˆ
∗α2−1
2,2
]
(35)
As a consequence, the capital accumulation equation at t = 1 becomes:
(1 + n)(1 + g)(ρ1kˆ
∗
1,2 + ρ2kˆ
∗
2,2) =
β
1 + β
ρ1(1− α1)kˆaut1 α1 + (36)
+
β
1 + β
ρ2(1− α2)
(
kˆaut2,1
α2 − (1 + n)(1 + g)τw,2kˆ
∗α2
2,2
βα2kˆ
∗α2−1
2,2
)
29
which implies that the world interest rate R∗2 needs to satisfy the equation below:
(1 + n)(1 + g)
∑
i
ρi
(
R∗2
αi
) 1
αi−1
=
β
1 + β
ρ1(1− α1)
(
Raut1
α1
) α1
α1−1
+ (37)
+
β
1 + β
ρ2(1− α2)
(Raut2,1
α2
) α2
α2−1 −
(1 + n)(1 + g)τw,2
(
R∗2
α2
) α2
α2−1
βR∗2

where Raut1 and R
aut
2,1 are given.
Second generation - The second generation would face instead a tax on labor income:
cy∗2,2 = w
∗
2,2(1− τw,2)− s∗2,2 (38)
co∗2,3 = s
∗
2,2(1 + r
∗
3) (39)
which implies that the saving function is:
s∗2,2 =
β
1 + β
w∗2,2(1− τw,2) =
β
1 + β
(1− α2)kˆ∗2,2α2(1− τw,2)Z2,2 (40)
Therefore, the capital accumulation equation at t = 2 is:
(1+n)(1+g)(ρ1kˆ
∗
1,2+ρ2kˆ
∗
2,2) =
β
1 + β
[
ρ1(1− α1)kˆ∗1,2α1 + ρ2(1− α2)kˆ∗2,2α2(1− τw,2)
]
(41)
The equation that pins down the interest rate at t = 3 is then:
(1 + n)(1 + g)
∑
i
ρi
(
R∗3
αi
) 1
αi−1
=
β
1 + β
[
ρ1(1− α1)
(
R∗2
α1
) α1
α1−1
+ ρ2(1− α2)
(
R∗2
α2
) α2
α2−1
(1− τw,2)
]
(42)
Therefore, the path for the world interest rate can be found using (37), (42) and (62) for
t ≥ 3.
We calculate the gains from international financial integration for the small developing
economy case following the same procedure as in section 4.
Figure 12 reports the welfare effects of international financial integration for the gen-
erations born in the developing country for different values of the labour income tax. The
figure shows that for a sufficiently high value of the labour income tax, the first generation
would gain from the process of international financial integration through a reduction of
the welfare gains of the second generation. Although the naked eye cannot detect this
pattern from the figure, not only the generation that is directly taxed is affected by the
redistribution policy between the first and the second generation. Since the first two
generations save less because of the fiscal policy, the convergence to the steady state is
slower hence even the subsequent generations would be slightly affected by the policy,
albeit indirectly.
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Figure 12: The intergenerational effects of IFI for a small developing economy for different values of the
labor income tax.
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This shows that a simple redistribution policy where the first generation is compensated
is enough to make sure that the process of international financial integration is Pareto
improving.
5.2 Fiscal redistribution in the large emerging economy case
In section 4, we have shown that a developed economy suffers from non-negligible spillover
effects if a large emerging country such as China opens its financial markets. While the
country benefits from a social planner’s perspective, only the first few generations actually
enjoy a welfare gain because of a higher return on their savings. However, the subsequent
generations lose as their wage falls as compared to autarky. Although each generation
would benefit from a higher return on savings, this is not enough to compensate the fall in
the lifetime income. In the steady state of the economy, generations born in the developed
country can lose up to 5% in equivalent consumption as compared to autarky. Therefore,
our next task is to design a redistribution policy in the developed country such that all
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generations can be better off.
To this purpose, we design a fiscal policy which taxes capital income, which is enjoyed
by the old in the economy at any given period, and redistribute it to the workers (the
young). Let us define Tc,t as the transfer per capita received by the young, while τc,t as
the tax on capital income. The government budget in the developed country is then:
L1,tTc,t = L1,t−1τc,tRts1,t−1 (43)
Since s1,t−1L1,t−1 = K1,t + A1,t, then:
L1,tTc,t = τc,tRt(K1,t + A1,t) (44)
Notice that capital income includes the return on domestic capital (K1,t) as well as foreign-
owned capital (A1,t). Multiplying each side by Z1,t and rearranging, we get:
Tc,t = τc,tRt(kˆ1,t + aˆ1,t)Z1,t (45)
First generation - The first generation will be subject to a tax on capital income as
follows:
cy∗1,1 = w
aut
1 − s∗1,1 (46)
co∗1,2 = s
∗
1,1R
∗
2(1− τc,2) (47)
The saving function of the first generation is not affected by the tax:
s∗1,1 =
β
1 + β
waut1 =
β
1 + β
(1− α1)kˆaut1 α1Z1,1 (48)
However, its consumption when old will be:
cy∗1,1 =
1
1 + β
waut1 (49)
co∗1,2 =
β
1 + β
waut1 R
∗
2(1− τc,2) (50)
Subsequent generations - The future generations will also be subject to a tax on capital
income but will also benefit from a government transfer when young. For t ≥ 2, the
following budget constraint will hold instead:
cy∗1,t = w
∗
1,t − s∗1,t + T ∗c,t (51)
co∗1,t+1 = s
∗
1,tR
∗
t+1(1− τc,t+1) (52)
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implying that the saving function is15:
s∗1,t =
β
1 + β
(w∗1,t + T
∗
c,t) =
β
1 + β
(
(1− α1)kˆ∗1,tα1 + τc,tR∗t (kˆ∗1,t + aˆ∗1,t)
)
Z1,t (53)
or
s∗1,t =
β
1 + β
(
(1− α1 + α1τc,t)kˆ∗1,tα1 + τc,tR∗t aˆ∗1,t
)
Z1,t (54)
which implies that the consumption allocation is:
cy∗1,t =
1
1 + β
((1− α1 + α1τc,t)kˆ∗α11,t + τc,tR∗t aˆ1,t)Z1,t (55)
co∗1,t+1 =
β
1 + β
((1− α1 + α1τc,t)kˆ∗α11,t + τc,tR∗t aˆ1,t)R∗t+1(1− τc,t+1)Z1,t (56)
Let us also assume that the large emerging economy carries out the redistribution
policy in favour of the first generation as described in the previous subsection. We then
compute the world interest rate path in a situation where both governments commit to
and implement a redistribution policy. At t = 1, the two saving functions are (48) and
(35), while for t = 2 we use (54) and (40). For t ≥ 3, the saving function of the developing
country is the standard one as the policy only involves the first two generations, while
(54) still applies to the developed country.
Following the results of the previous section, we set the labour income tax rate in China
in period 2 to 20%: we will see below that this is enough for the first generation in China
to be compensated and enjoy a welfare gain from international financial integration.
Given τw = 0.2, let us then characterize a path of capital income tax in the developed
country which ensures that international financial integration is Pareto superior with
respect to financial autarky. Firstly, the tax imposed on the first generation must be such
that it still gains from international financial integration. As only the consumption when
old is affected by the tax, this implies that co∗1,2 > c
o aut
1,2 must hold or alternatively:
τc,2 <
R∗2 −Raut1
R∗2
(57)
where the autarkic interest rate and the world interest rate in period 2 are both given, as
the saving function of the first generation is not affected by the tax. Another condition
15The redistribution policy has an unambiguously positive effect on savings. Although a tax on capital income alters the
relative price of consumption in the two periods, the substitution effect cancels out the income effect under logarithmic
utility. Hence, the only channel at work is the increase in the lifetime income of the young due to the redistribution policy.
Notice that if we departed from log utility and assumed that the income effect dominates the substitution effect (which
holds for low values of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution), the positive impact of the capital income tax on savings
would be reinforced.
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is that τc,2 must be sufficiently high to allow the lifetime income of the second generation
to be no less than under autarky:
(1− α1 + α1τc,2)kˆ∗α11,2 + τc,2R∗2aˆ1,2 ≥ (1− α1)kˆaut1 α1
⇐⇒ τc,2 ≥
(1− α1)(kˆaut1 α1 − kˆ∗α11,2 )
R∗2(kˆ1,2 + aˆ1,2)
(58)
This condition guarantees that the consumption of the young is no less than in autarky.
The two conditions basically give us respectively an upper and a lower bound on the tax.
Let us implement the lower bound on the tax, so that the tax is not too high to erase
completely the welfare gain of the first generation while the young at t = 2 sees no change
in its income:
τ ∗c,2 =
(1− α1)(kˆaut1 α1 − kˆ∗α11,2 )
R∗2(kˆ1,2 + aˆ1,2)
Given τ ∗c,2, we calculate the interest rate in period R
∗
3 using the capital accumulation
equation at t = 2. We repeat the same reasoning to determine the capital income tax at
t = 3. Similarly, the aim is that the tax is low enough so that the second generation gains
while the tax should be high enough to ensure that the income of the third generation is
no less than the autarkic income. Since the income of the second generation is the same
as in autarky under τ ∗c,2, the second generation will gain as long as the consumption when
old is higher than in autarky, which is equivalent to the following condition:
τc,3 <
R∗3 −Raut1
R∗3
(59)
The third generation has an income no less than in closed economy as long as:
τc,3 ≥
(1− α1)(kˆaut1 α1 − kˆ∗α11,3 )
R∗3(kˆ1,3 + aˆ1,3)
(60)
As before, we choose the lower bound on the tax:
τ ∗c,3 =
(1− α1)(kˆaut1 α1 − kˆ∗α11,3 )
R∗3(kˆ1,3 + aˆ1,3)
(61)
Therefore, we proceed by induction to find a path for the capital income tax which would
make everyone better off.
Figure 13 shows that taxation on capital income should increase in the transition to
the steady state. The reason is that as the welfare losses progressively increase (Figure
11), capital income should be taxed more aggressively. Under the path for the capital
income tax identified above, we can see from Figure 14 that the redistribution policy
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Figure 13: A Pareto improving path for the capital income tax.
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ensures that all generations gain from China’s financial integration and not just the first
few generations.
Figure 15 illustrates the intergenerational effects of the redistribution policies for China.
If the developed country does not redistribute, a labour income tax of 20% in the sec-
ond period is enough to ensure that the first generation in China is also gaining from
international financial integration (see Figure 10). It is also interesting to observe that
China would also benefit from a redistribution policy in the developed country. Since the
capital income tax in the developed country stimulates savings (equation (54)), capital
accumulation in the world economy is intensified and China is able to reach an even higher
steady state.
6 Conclusions
This paper takes seriously the most recent evidence showing that there is significant
variation of capital shares across countries (Feenstra, Inklaar and Timmer, 2015). In this
context, we study the consequences of international financial integration, both in terms
of the direction of capital flows and their welfare implications.
Our results challenge the belief that neoclassical growth models are not able to support
the idea that openness of the capital account is a desirable policy reform for developing
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Figure 14: The spillover effects on the developed country of China’s financial integration when capital
income is taxed and redistributed to the workers.
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Figure 15: The intergenerational effects of international financial integration for China when the first
generation is compensated.
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countries. We have shown that since developing countries tend to have a higher capital
share, capital inflows allow them to reach a higher steady state as compared to financial
autarky. The permanent as opposed to the transitory nature of capital flows generates
large welfare gains for developing countries.
The paper also emphasizes that there are important intergenerational effects. We
offer a rationale as to why there is often resistance to financial openness in developing
countries: the current generation would suffer from the opening of capital markets and
would decide against it if they have the political power. However, this would come at
the expense of all future generations which would be able to reap large gains. While the
developed country is barely affected by the decision of a small country of opening their
capital markets, we demonstrate that the financial integration of a large emerging country
has non-negligible spillover effects. In the developed country, the initial generation would
gain from exporting capital as they enjoy a higher return on their savings. But as the
country converges to a lower steady state, the subsequent generations lose out as they
receive a lower lifetime income.
Finally, we show that redistribution policies within countries can be designed to com-
pensate the losers from international financial integration. For international financial in-
tegration to be Pareto superior to autarky, the developing country should tax the labour
income of the second generation to compensate the first generation, while the developed
country should tax capital income and redistribute it to the workers.
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Appendix
Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Firstly, we compute the derivative of kˆ with respect to α using equation (10):
∂kˆ
∂α
=
[
β(1− α)
(1 + β)(1 + n)(1 + g)
] 1
1−α
· 1
(1− α)2 ·
[
log
(
β(1− α)
(1 + β)(1 + n)(1 + g)
)
− 1
]
Since β(1−α)
(1+β)(1+n)(1+g)
< 1, then ∂kˆ
∂α
< 0.
Second, the derivative of R with respect to α is (see equation (11)):
∂R
∂α
=
(1 + β)(1 + n)(1 + g)
β(1− α)2 > 0
Proof of Corollary 1
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Suppose that country 1 has the same level of capital of country 2: kˆaut1 = kˆ
aut
2 . Then,
it is easy to show that kˆaut
α1
2 > kˆ
autα2
2 since kˆ
aut
2 < 1 (equation (10)). However, we have
proved that country 1’s level of capital in autarky is higher (Proposition 1). Hence, it
follows that: kˆaut
α1
1 > kˆ
autα1
2 > kˆ
autα2
2 .
Proof of Proposition 2
First, let us rewrite (15) using Rt = αik
αi−1
i,t :∑
i
ρi
(
R∗t+1
αi
) 1
αi−1
=
β
(1 + β)(1 + n)(1 + g)
[∑
i
ρi(1− αi)
(
R∗t
αi
) αi
αi−1
]
(62)
Using the implicit function theorem, we find that:
dRt+1
dRt
(Rt) =
β
(1+β)(1+n)(1+g)
[∑
i ρi
(
Rt
αi
) 1
αi−1
]
∑
i
ρi
αi(1−αi)
(
Rt+1
αi
) 2−αi
αi−1
> 0 ∀ Rt (63)
Since the derivative exists, we can write Rt+1 = φ(Rt). The difference equation is an
increasing function, with φ(0) = 0. It can also be checked that limRt→0 φ
′(Rt) = ∞ and
limRt→∞ φ
′(Rt) = 0. These conditions imply that a stable steady state exists. Moreover,
we have that φ′′(Rt) < 0. Concavity of the φ function means that the steady state is
unique.
Proof of Proposition 3
Country i’s net foreign assets at the steady state is:
aˆi =
β
(1 + β)(1 + n)(1 + g)
(1− αi)
(
R
αi
) αi
αi−1 −
(
R
αi
) 1
αi−1
(64)
Suppose that aˆi(R
∗) > 0 for some i. By directly manipulating the above equation, it
turns out that this is true only as long as R∗ > Rauti . Similarly, aˆi(R
∗) < 0 if R∗ < Rauti .
Suppose that Rauti > R∗ for every i. Then, we would have that aˆi(R∗) 6 0 for every
i and
∑
i aˆi(R
∗) < 0 (where the equality sign disappears as Raut1 6= Raut2 by assumption).
For the same reason, R∗ > Rauti for every i is impossible. In order for R∗ to clear the
world capital market, the only possibility is that Raut1 < R
∗ < Raut2 . Hence, at the world
steady state, aˆ2(R
∗) < 0 and aˆ1(R∗) > 0.
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Proof of Corollary 2
Trivial.
Proof of Proposition 4
We are interested in showing that yˆ∗1,t > yˆ
∗
2,t for any R
∗
t ≥ R∗. Using the first-order
conditions of the firm in open economy (12):
yˆ∗1,t > yˆ
∗
2,t ⇔
(
R∗t
α1
) α1
α1−1
>
(
R∗t
α2
) α2
α2−1
After a few steps, the inequality can be rearranged as follows:
R∗t >
α
α2(1−α1)
α2−α1
2
α
α1(1−α2)
α2−α1
1
≡ R¯
This is a necessary and sufficient condition for country 1 to have a higher output than
country 2 for any given interest rate R∗t . Our strategy to check that this inequality actually
holds in equilibrium is the following. We know that R∗ > Raut1 by Proposition 3. If we
can show that Raut1 > R¯, then R
∗ > R¯ and therefore the inequality holds for any R∗t > R∗.
Raut1 > R¯ ⇔
α1(1 + β)(1 + n)(1 + g)
β(1− α1) >
α
α2(1−α1)
α2−α1
2
α
α1(1−α2)
α2−α1
1
which, upon rearranging, becomes:
(1 + β)(1 + n)(1 + g)
β(1− α1) >
(
α2
α1
)α2(1−α1)
α2−α1
which is the sufficient condition stated in the Proposition.
Proof of Proposition 5
The first step is to show that Raut2,2 > R
∗
2 > R
aut
1 , where R
aut
2,2 and R
aut
1 are respec-
tively the interest rates that would prevail in country 2 and 1 if they remained in au-
tarky. To start with, let us prove by contradiction that R∗2 6= Raut2,2 . If R∗2 = Raut2,2 ,
then the young in country 2 would not trade capital even if they were allowed to do
so. Therefore, the demand for capital would be equal to savings (which are given):
(1 + n)(1 + g)kˆ2,2 = sˆ2,1. In country 1, the demand for capital would be lower than in
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autarky as Raut1 < R
aut
2 < R
aut
2,2 = R
∗
2: (1+n)(1+g)kˆ1,2 < sˆ1,1. But then, the world capital
market does not clear since (1+n)(1+g)
∑
i kˆi,2 <
∑
i sˆi,1. Similarly, it can be proved that
R∗2 6= Raut1 as the aggregate demand for capital would exceed aggregate savings. In the
initial period, each country’s savings are given. Since the demand for capital is decreas-
ing in R, it must be that Raut2,2 > R
∗
2 > R
aut
1 in order for (1+n)(1+g)
∑
i aˆi(R
∗
2) = 0 to hold.
It is then straightforward to show which country is the international borrower. Since
R∗2 < R
aut
2,2 , then (1 + n)(1 + g)kˆ
∗
2,2 > sˆ2,1. Therefore, therefore (1 + n)(1 + g)aˆ
∗
2,2 < 0.
Proof of Proposition 6
Since kˆi,t+1 =
(
Rt+1
αi
) 1
αi−1 , Rt+1 = φ(Rt) and Rt = αikˆ
αi−1
i,t , we can write the following
accumulation equation for the capital stock per effective units of labour of country i:
kˆi,t+1 = ψ(kˆi,t) =
(
φ(αikˆ
αi−1
i,t )
αi
) 1
αi−1
We now compute the first and the second derivative:
∂kˆi,t+1
∂kˆi,t
=
(
φ(αikˆ
α−1
i,t )
αi
) 2−αi
αi−1
· φ′(Rt) · kˆαi−2i,t
∂2kˆi,t+1
(∂kˆi,t)2
= φ′′(Rt) · kˆαi−2i,t ·
(
φ(αikˆ
αi−1
i,t )
αi
) 2−αi
αi−1
+
+ φ′(Rt) · (αi − 2)kˆαi−3i,t ·
(
φ(αikˆ
αi−1
i,t )
αi
) 2−αi
αi−1
+
+ φ′(Rt) · kˆαi−2i,t · (2− αi)
(
φ(αikˆ
αi−1
i,t )
αi
) 3−αi
αi−1
φ′(Rt)kˆ
αi−2
i,t
The first derivative is positive since φ′(Rt) > 0 by Proposition 2. The second derivative
is negative since φ′′(Rt) < 0. Therefore, the above function is increasing and concave.
Proof of Proposition 7
By Assumption 2, the initial interest rate is higher than the steady state interest rate
in the integrated economy. Therefore, we must show that Raut2,t+1 > R
∗
t+1 > R
aut
1,t+1 for every
R∗t > R∗.
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Firstly, we verify that Raut2,t+1 > R
aut
1,t+1 for any R
∗
t > R∗. Given R∗t , the autarkic interest
rate of country i is derived by manipulating the domestic capital market clearing equation.
We find that Rauti,t+1 ≡
[
(1+β)(1+n)(1+g)αi
β(1−αi)
]1−αi
R∗αit . Plugging the autarkic interest rates into
Raut2,t+1 > R
aut
1,t+1 we obtain the following condition:
R∗t >
(1 + β)(1 + n)(1 + g)
β

(
α1
1−α1
)1−α1
(
α2
1−α2
)1−α2

1
α2−α1
≡ R˜ (65)
The next step is to check that Raut1 > R˜:
α1(1 + β)(1 + n)(1 + g)
(1− α1)β >
(1 + β)(1 + n)(1 + g)
β

(
α1
1−α1
)1−α1
(
α2
1−α2
)1−α2

1
α2−α1
The above inequality can be simplified to α1 < α2, which holds by assumption. Since
Raut2 > R
∗ > Raut1 and R
aut
1 > R˜, then R
∗ > R˜. Therefore, inequality (65) holds for
R∗t > R∗.
We can now prove that the world interest rate is in between the autarkic interest rates:
Raut2,t+1 > R
∗
t+1 > R
aut
1,t+1. The argument is now routine. If R
aut
i,t+1 > R∗t+1 for every i, we
would have that (1+n)(1+g)
∑
i aˆi(R
∗
t , R
∗
t+1) < 0. The opposite is true for R
∗
t+1 > Rauti,t+1.
Given R∗t , the equilibrium interest rate at t + 1 must lie between the corresponding au-
tarkic steady states for the world capital market to clear.
Finally, the net foreign assets of country i along the transition:
(1 + n)(1 + g)aˆi(R
∗
t , R
∗
t+1) ≡
β(1− αi)
(1 + β)
(
R∗t
αi
) αi
αi−1 − (1 + n)(1 + g)
(
R∗t+1
αi
) 1
αi−1
For country 1, we have that R∗t+1 > R
aut
1,t+1. Then, (1 + n)(1 + g)kˆ
∗
1,t+1 < sˆ
∗
1,t or
(1 + n)(1 + g)aˆ1(R
∗
t , R
∗
t+1) > 0. On the other hand, country 2 will import capital, i.e.
(1 + n)(1 + g)aˆ2(R
∗
t , R
∗
t+1) < 0.
Appendix B: Empirical evidence
The capital share is calculated as 1 minus the share of labour compensation in GDP
at current national prices. Output per capita is output-side real GDP at current PPPs
divided by the population. Output per effective labor units is calculated as output per
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capita divided by TFP level at current PPPs. The net FDI position is calculated as net
FDI=FDI assets−FDI liabilities.
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